The Value of War: Niccolo Machiavelli's (Ir)relevance to the Modern World

April 18^th, 2016

In the history of political thought, few theorists have inspired the same degree of controversy as surrounds Niccolo Machiavelli. His most famous work, The Prince, was strikingly different to political thought of the time, as it abandoned the Catholic emphasis on morality in favour of harsh pragmatism. Machiavelli argued that a ruler should act in accordance with how the world truly is – that a prince’s only responsibility should be to the advancement of his own power and the security of his state. The purpose of this essay is not to debate the inherent morality of these claims, but to consider their relevance to the contemporary political world. The following paragraphs will examine the reality of Machiavelli’s time and explain that the views expressed in his book – at least those regarding the nature of states and their rulers - are simply a reflection of his own experience. The Western world which he advised is no longer dominated by warring principalities, but by democracies, and no democratic nation has ever declared war on another. Even the United States, the most powerful and militaristic nation in the world, is limited in its ability to employ Machiavelli’s advice. Ultimately, this essay argues that The Prince can no longer be used as a definite manual for effective rule, as the nature of governance has fundamentally changed since the time of its writing.

While The Prince reads as if it were some manual offering objective truths, the book was very much a product of the time and place in which Machiavelli lived. Over the course of the fifteenth century, the Italian peninsula was embroiled in a series of conflicts called The Italian Wars, in which the many cities of Italy fought both each other and the encroaching armies of France and Spain.[1] It was a time in which states rose and fell overnight, with lands being annexed and rulers usurped. Florence itself – the city which coloured most of Machiavelli’s experience – was subject to “a series of long, debilitating wars: with Giangaleazzo Visconti of Milan, Ladislas of Naples and others.”[2] The entire era was characterized by this sort of instability. It was thus Machiavelli’s opinion that a prince “must have no other object or thought, nor acquire skill in anything except war, its organization, and its discipline. The art of war is all that is expected of a ruler.”[3] It is understandable, given the political climate of Florence at the time, that he would adopt this stance. Machiavelli saw an era of political instability and reasoned that the foremost responsibility of a ruler should be to achieve order. He saw a time in which states were maintained not through mutual peace, but through the dissolution of other nations, and thus reasoned that war takes precedence above all else. As Anthony Grafton notes in his introduction to The Prince, “Machiavelli was in many ways a characteristic product of Florence."[4] Ultimately, his views were not actually objective - they were written within the context of a specific, era, and thus reflect that era.

This idea is given even greater credence when one considers not just the broader reality of the Renaissance era, but Machiavelli’s own personal struggle. During his lifetime, governance of Florence switched hands from the Medici family, to Piero Soderini, and then to the Medici again.[5] As Machiavelli served as a key administrator within the Soderini government, he faced accusations of conspiracy upon the Medici’s return.[6] They subjected him to twenty two days of torture and imprisonment, ending in his exile from Florence.[7] Much of Machiavelli’s cynicism - his belief that rulers must inflict cruelty when necessary, without any consideration for morality - was no doubt influenced by his imprisonment. It is difficult to imagine that he could ever properly divorce himself from such a trauma, and Machiavelli himself admits to this in The Prince, explaining that he faced “affliction and peril … the great and unremitting malice of fortune.”[8] Once again, The Prince is revealed to be not an objective, widely applicable manual, but a direct reflection of Machiavelli’s personal struggle. This is further seen in the fact that the book was written as a gift to Lorenzo Medici, in a desperate bid to gain his favour and return to political life. Machiavelli was in no position to admonish the Medici’s for the torture he endured, as he was entirely at their mercy. It thus follows that The Prince may have been compromised by this reality. Machiavelli set a precedent for this in The Florentine Histories (commissioned by Giulio de’Medici), in which he “honestly prais[ed] their foreign policy and pay[ed] less attention to the loss of liberty attending the Magnificent’s final decade of rule.”[9] Machiavelli would be even more inclined to change his views in The Prince, as it was not simply a commission, but a desperate plea to return to political life. He would therefore not want to challenge Lorenzo, but flatter him, and Machiavelli was clearly aware of the value of appearances. The books final words – a rallying cry to liberate Italy - once again remind readers that despite being presented as an objective manual, the book was but one man’s personal response to the instability of Renaissance Italy. The Prince should not apply to the contemporary political world, as it was obviously not written for it.

Machiavelli’s views are no longer relevant not only because they were a product of his personal experience, but also because the political world which he described does not accurately reflect modern politics. While he spoke at length about his own time and that which came before him, he did not give much consideration to the future - to the emergence of democracy as the dominant form of western government. He opens The Prince by saying, “All the dominions under whose authority men have lived in the past and live now have been and are either republics or principalities … I shall leave out any discussion of republics.”[10] The entire book is written specifically in regards to principalities and thus, by its very nature, cannot be applied to the democratic republics of the present day. Machiavelli modeled small-scale, city-state politics, in which a small group of leaders exercised complete control over their respective territories. These men possessed far greater powers than any democratically elected leader could hope to wield, and thus Machiavelli was able to recommend cruelty when necessary. He says, “a man who wants to act virtuously in every way necessarily comes to grief among so many who are not virtuous.”[11] From this premise, Machiavelli permits leaders to employ “terror tactics; the employment of brutal subordinates, who could be executed with brutality themselves once they had carried out their tasks; even the mass murder of one’s political opponents.”[12] In Machiavelli’s time, rulers acted as violently as they wished without any fear of reprisal, as law was defined solely by their word. In modern times, however, almost all western leaders are democratically elected, and thus at the mercy of both law and the voting public. A recent example of this is forced resignation of Icelandic Prime Minister Sigmundur Davíð Gunnlaugsson, after the public became aware of his tax evasion via an offshore investment company.[13] The fact that citizens were even able to protest his corruption reveals just how far the nature of government has changed. If a modern leader was to follow Machiavelli’s advice and terrorize their people, execute their political opponents, or declare war in the name of expansionism, they would be indicted. The very nature of democracy discourages cruelty and war. It is also therefore no coincidence that no democratic nation has ever declared war on another. This is the basis of the Democratic Peace Thesis, a liberal philosophy in direct opposition to Machiavelli’s supposed political realism.[14] It posits that democracies are hesitant to engage in armed conflict due to the fact that politicians are publicly accountable for their actions.[15] As a result, leaders are more willing to resolve conflict through diplomacy rather than war, and view other democratic nations as allies rather than enemies.[16] This is why boundary lines within Europe have remained largely unchanged since the Second World War. At least in the western world, military power is no longer a significant factor in the security of nations. Machiavelli’s core belief – that a prince “must have no other object or thought, nor acquire skill in anything except war” – is therefore proven to be irrelevant in the modern era.[17]

A logical counter-argument to the assertion that The Prince is no longer relevant is that of the United States. Their political system and foreign policy is generally taken by many to embody Machiavelli’s beliefs regarding political posturing, deception, and war. This is not an entirely incorrect assumption, as the United States is the foremost military power in the world and they have made war, as Machiavelli suggested, their sole occupation. However, due to the previously discussed limitations imposed by democracy, Americans find themselves unwilling to follow critical components of Machiavelli’s advice. The most immediate example of this is their involvement in the Middle East: namely, the war in Iraq. In accordance with Machiavelli’s instruction, they invaded the area, punished rebels (al-Qaeda, etc.), and then spent the better part of a decade probing for and eliminating insurgency.[18] They failed, however, to follow The Prince in two critical areas: they invaded the country without the willingness of its people, and upon invading refused to establish permanent settlements.[19] While it is difficult to determine their exact motivations for doing so, it is important to consider that invasion was labelled “Operation Iraqi Freedom.”[20] Much of the rationale for invading was to spread democracy and liberty - outright occupying the nation would be at odds with this rhetoric.[21] In The Prince, Machiavelli explains the fault in this: if a prince merely sends in troops instead of establishing settlements, he “does far more injury, because he harms the whole state by billeting his army in different parts of the country, everyone suffers from this annoyance, and everybody is turned into an enemy. And those who grow hostile can do harm, because they remain, defeated, in their own homes.”[22] The scenario that Machiavelli described mirrors exactly what occurred in the Middle East. The United States’ political leaders invaded under the guise of democracy, and thus opted for a half-measure, where they overthrew Saddam Hussein but left the region destabilized. As a result, those few left “defeated, in their homes” formed the Islamic State (ISIL), and mobilized an entire region of people filled with hatred for the United States. The assertion being argued – that the United States was afraid of reprisal - is not actually one of conjecture, but based in fact. In 2014, Russian troops illegally annexed the Crimean Peninsula, and thus received an overwhelmingly negative response from the international community. In accordance with the Democratic Peace Thesis, the nations of Europe responded not with military action, but by imposing economic restrictions on trade with Russia – thereby exacerbating the downward spiral of it’s already failing economy.[23] If the United States were to try and take the country for itself, and establish an American government, the outcry would be tremendous - likely greater than that which Russia received. In the end, Machiavelli’s advice is clearly no longer relevant to the contemporary world, as it cannot be used to its fullest extent by the country most well equipped to do so.

Ultimately, the nature of both governance and global politics has drastically changed since the fifteenth century such that The Prince is no longer an effective guide for world leaders. Machiavelli’s belief that a ruler’s only occupation should be war spoke not to the reality of the entire world, but to the specific time and place in which he lived. His desperate desire to please Lorenzo Medici and return to politics, in combination with the torture and exile he experienced, reveal The Prince to be merely a reflection of his own personal misfortune. The book was clearly written in regards to Renaissance-era principalities, and thus does not apply to the relatively peaceful democracies of the modern day. As explained by the Democratic Peace Thesis, contemporary western leaders are held more accountable for their actions and thus cannot exercise the vast powers used by the rulers of Machiavelli’s Italy. The new democratic world no longer accepts Machiavelli’s attitudes in regards to war, and as a result even the most militaristic nation in the world – the United States – is restricted in their ability to carry out his advice. They are prevented from fully invading other countries, resulting in a foreign policy which only destabilizes regions. To evaluate Machiavelli’s advice and determine which parts of it are applicable to the modern day, one must already have a thorough understanding of the world as it currently is. Thus, The Prince is no longer an effective model of contemporary politics – it is, in all aspects, a product of a bygone age.

Works Cited

[1] Belliotti, Raymond A. Niccolò Machiavelli: The Laughing Lion and the Strutting Fox. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009.

[2] Grafton, Anthony. Introduction. The Prince. By Niccolo Machiavelli. London: Penguin, 2003

[3] Machiavelli, Niccolo. The Prince. London: Penguin, 2003. p. 47.

[4] Grafton, Anthony. Introduction. The Prince. By Niccolo Machiavelli. London: Penguin, 2003

[5] Grafton, Anthony.

[6] Grafton, Anthony.

[7] Belliotti, Raymond A. Niccolò Machiavelli: The Laughing Lion and the Strutting Fox. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009.

[8] Machiavelli, Niccolo. The Prince. London: Penguin, 2003. p. 4.

[9] Grafton, Anthony. Introduction. The Prince. By Niccolo Machiavelli. London: Penguin, 2003

[10] Machiavelli, Niccolo. The Prince. London: Penguin, 2003. p. 5.

[11] Machiavelli, Niccolo. p. 50.

[12] Grafton, Anthony. Introduction. The Prince. By Niccolo Machiavelli. London: Penguin, 2003

[13] Henley, Jon. "Iceland PM Steps aside after Protests over Panama Papers Revelations." The Guardian. April 05, 2016.

[14] Reiter, Dan. "Democratic Peace Theory." Political Science - Oxford Bibliographies. October 25, 2012.

[15] Reiter, Dan.

[16] Reiter, Dan.

[17] Machiavelli, Niccolo. The Prince. London: Penguin, 2003. p. 47.

[18] The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. "Iraq War." Encyclopedia Britannica Online.

[19] The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica.

[20] The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica.

[21] "President Discusses the Future of Iraq." The Whitehouse: Archives. February 26, 2003.

[22] Machiavelli, Niccolo. The Prince. London: Penguin, 2003. p. 11.

[23] "Sanctions after Crimea: Have They Worked?" NATO Review.

References

Belliotti, Raymond A. Niccolò Machiavelli: The Laughing Lion and the Strutting Fox. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009.

Grafton, Anthony. Introduction. The Prince. By Niccolo Machiavelli. London: Penguin, 2003

Henley, Jon. "Iceland PM Steps aside after Protests over Panama Papers Revelations." The Guardian. April 05, 2016. Accessed April 17, 2016. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/05/iceland-prime-minister-resigns-over-panama-papers-revelations.

Machiavelli, Niccolo. The Prince. London: Penguin, 2003.

"Sanctions after Crimea: Have They Worked?" NATO Review. Accessed April 17, 2016. http://www.nato.int/docu/Review/2015/Russia/sanctions-after-crimea-have-they-worked/EN/index.htm.

Reiter, Dan. "Democratic Peace Theory." Political Science - Oxford Bibliographies. October 25, 2012. Accessed April 17, 2016. http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199756223/obo-9780199756223-0014.xml.

The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica. "Iraq War." Encyclopedia Britannica Online. Accessed April 17, 2016. https://www.britannica.com/event/Iraq-War.

"President Discusses the Future of Iraq." The Whitehouse: Archives. February 26, 2003. Accessed April 17, 2016. http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030226-11.html.